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1. Buddhist Perceptions of Selfhood
The dominant perception and imaging of the human self and its rela­
tion to its environing world play a pervasive and determinative role in 
any ethical system and its enveloping culture. This is no less true of Bud­
dhist and Buddhist-modified cultures than of any others; perhaps it is 
even more so, in fact, because of the central importance which self­
views have in Buddhism.
The immediate fact to be faced, of course, is the classic Pali Canon 
assertion—foundational to Theravada traditions, and strongly influen­
tial in the Mahayana viewpoints—that there is no “self” in its or­
dinary sense and experience. The outlines of this assertion are familiar. 
The individual “self’ is actually only a very temporary collection of 
four visceral-psychic and one physical-formful factor (skandhas).' 
They are mutually dependent in their arising and continuing associa­
tion in the “Self.” There is no abiding “self” present either among or 
in the totality of the five factors.
Their ongoing name and form of “personal” character is like an in­
cessantly moving-changing stream of rapidly succeeding mental­
physical items and moments of existence, flowing within the bounds of 
seeming identity. Any given moment or state of formful existence is 
but a link or stage, neither totally different nor exactly the same as its 
successor or predecessor. These “personal” streams go on in their 
largely independent courses, worlds without beginning or end, with
1 For the most part the more familiar Sanskrit terms will be used even though referr­
ing to them in a Pali context (e.g. skandhas for khan das. Nirvana for Nibbdna).
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their succeeding embodiments varying according to the moral quality 
of previous actions (karma). But whether more or less fortunate, their 
innate character is impermanence (anicca), substanceless irreality (anM- 
ma), and hence innately dis-ease and intrinsic suffering (duMcha).2 And 
the selfs environing world order is of the same sort—chains of ever­
changing, causally determined states of elements characterized by heat 
(fire), solidity (earth), motion (air), and cohesion (water).
2 Edward Conze wrote regarding the Pali Canon, “description” of the self:
The formula is manifestly intended as a guide to meditation and not as a basis 
for speculation. (Buddhist Thought in India, London: Allen and Unwin, 
1962, p. 37)
With this I agree, but 1. Theravada Buddhists tend to take it quite literally, and 2. the 
ethical result is much the same in either case.
The Mahayana version of human selfhood is a modification of the 
Pali Canon view rather than a radically varying account. Or perhaps 
one should speak of the varied Mahayana statements about the self, 
since there are several of them. However it may rather generally be said 
that with very few exceptions (JOdo and Nichiren?) all the versions 
show the influence of Taoist and Confucian perceptions of selfhood, 
The Chinese cosmos is perceived as an ongoing organic process rather 
than a somewhat mechanically conceived set of causal chains (in­
cluding those of living beings) which move forward in eternal lockstep 
side by side from an infinite past into an infinite future as in the Pali 
canon. In this Mahayanist organic world the human individual is in all 
aspects an intrinsic part of it, a cell within it, which lives, moves, and 
has its being therein. Here it is difficult to distinguish the “mental” 
from the “physical” aspects of selfhood; these two aspects are con­
tinuously intermingling and overlapping in their self-internal activities 
and in selfs relation to the universe.
Resultingly the self in Mahayana has a somewhat more intimate and 
positive relation to the cosmic process than in the Pah canon view. 
There the presence of self in its universe is an ineluctable imprison­
ment, so to speak; in Mahayana it is an intimate involvement. Perhaps 
Hua-yen and Zen best manifest this quality. In Hua-yen the universe is 
“in” the individual entity-selves included—and the individual entity 
is “in” the universe. The famous parable of Fa Tsang in which each 
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mirror in the hall reflects the central Buddha image3 as well as every 
other mirror, including every other mirror’s reflection of itself, is the 
Hua-yen picture of this state of universal mutual implication and 
reciprocal containment. One particle’s movement affects the whole, 
and vice versa. In Zen we have the formless self, a non-self selfhood, 
which tangibly expresses the eternally formless and yet ever-forming 
Formlessness which is the ultimately real. From it flow (are constituted) 
the emptiness of forms (including the self) and into it they dissolve, for 
“form is emptiness and emptiness is form.”
1 The significance of the central Buddha image is of course the Buddha nature that is
(in) everything.
It is obvious that Buddhist self and Buddhist world, whether in the 
Pali Canon or Mahayanist perspective, are inextricably linked. The self 
views entail their accompanying world views, and the respective world 
views tend to “produce” their accompanying self views in true sym­
biosis. And it would seem to follow that any significant change in either 
would result in change for the other. As will be observed later this situa­
tion has an important bearing on Buddhist ethics.
2. The Summum Bonum and its Attainment
The Supreme Good or Value in an ethical tradition, if it can be 
defined, determines the nature of the total ethical structure in the final 
analysis. In the case of Buddhism it is perhaps better to speak of its 
existential optimum desideratum whose intrinsic nature necessitates 
a specific moral-mental discipline for its attainment, rather than of 
its supreme ethical goodness. And as to this there can be no doubt in 
Buddhism: its name is Nirvana. All of the approved, the “good” 
modes of conduct and inner attitude, tend toward this final goal. 
Indeed they are to be esteemed as “good” precisely because they do 
so tend. All other “goods” are only good-for, approved for leading 
to presumed but false benefits, and distractive of the total devotion 
necessary to attain to the Supreme Good.
The term “Nirvana” contains in its basic linguistic meaning the 
essence of its religious and ethical significance also. It portrays a “go­
ing out” as of a flame, a “going out” from the present order of ex­
istence, i.e. time-space embodiment as a “self,” or radically tran­
scending its time-space limitations of being. It is a final, definitive 1*
16
SELF-WORLD THEORY AND BUDDHIST ETHICS 
escape from embodied individuality and its limitations. In classic Pali 
Canon terms it is the utter end of the heretofore endless sequence of 
deaths and rebirths, the samsaric existence which is intrinsically and 
irremediably impermanent, empty of substantial reality, and full of 
suffering. In a word the Summum Bonum, or Optimum Desideratum 
in Buddhism is total escape from “selfhood” and its (“self’-created?) 
world.
The essence of this escape—which can be accomplished while still 
embodied, as demonstrated by the Buddha and the arhat—is that of 
overcoming the illusion of integral selfhood and the consequent 
snuffing (or starving) out of the urgencies of greed and hatred, and 
the delusions that make one a slave of one’s environing world. This 
requires a mental-emotional-moral discipline which demolishes, both 
conceptually and existentially-viscerally, the sense of unique, integral 
self-being, a seeing of oneself as one “really is”—a loosely joined 
series of mental-physical states. And simultaneously the world of loved 
and detested entities becomes a matter of indifference as a result of 
the escape from the “self’’-delusion; for escape from “self” entails 
escape from “selfs” world.
This Nirvanic mind-set, as perceived in the Pali Canon tradition has 
been described thus:
Just as a rock of one solid mass remains unshaken by the 
wind, even so neither visible forms, nor sounds, nor odours, 
nor tastes, nor bodily impressions, neither the desired nor the 
undesired, can cause such an one to waver. Steadfast is his 
mind, gained is his deliverance.4
4 Buddhist Dictionary, Nyanatiloka. Colombo: Frewin and Co., Third rev. ed., 
1972, under “Nibbana”.
In the Mahayana context the terminology and flavor of the intellectual 
and visceral “escape” into Nirvana are of course significantly different, 
though again, as always, a modification rather than reversal of the Pali 
Canon interpretation. In a phrase we might say that in Mahayana the 
salvational escape is not out of but into the self and its symbiotically 
related universe, at a deeper level.
This has been expressed in several differing but actually melding or 
harmonious ways. There is the general Mahayana sense of finding Nir-
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vana to be somehow within or identical with sams&ra; it is not precisely 
that samsara is to be reformed into Nirvana by human effort but 
reperceived as essentially Nirvanic at the same time. And one cannot 
but be aware here of the permeative effect of what de Groot called 
Chinese “universism.” After the death of Chuang Tzu’s wife his 
disciples were astounded to find him beating on a pan and singing. 
In answer to their questions he acknowledged that he had felt grief 
upon the death of his companion of many years and the mother of his 
children. At the same time he could not but be aware of the larger and 
fundamental meaning of her life and death: the Universe had lent her 
human form for a time and was now taking her back into the glorious 
greatness and harmony of the ongoing Cosmic Process. One also 
remembers the story of the three old men gleefully speculating on what 
form their individual substances would take when they next emerged 
from the all embracing Wholeness—perhaps a cricket, a bat’s wing, or 
some such thing.
Then there was also the Confucian Heaven-ordered universe with its 
inherent moral order, the “silent beauty of the moral law” as Con­
fucius termed it—and its all-inclusive nature which was transformed 
by Buddhism into the all-inclusive Buddha-Nature of the ultimately 
real. This Chinese “universism” also appears in the favorite Mahayana 
metaphor of the wave of individuality, momentarily differentiated 
from its Mother Ocean, then becoming “ocean” again. Thus it is both 
the “same” and “different” (the same because it it different?—so D.T. 
Suzuki), the living model of “form is nothingness and nothingness is 
form,” the Buddha (freed, nirvanic) nature in everyone waiting only to 
be recognized, and lastly the molecule-cosmos mutual implication of 
Hua-yen.
“Liberation” or “Nirvanic attainment” then in Mahayana, general­
ly speaking, has the quality of re-perceiving the universe and our rela­
tion to it. One acknowledges one’s unity with it beneath the seeming 
divisions and dualities which mark the ordinarily experienced world, in­
deed finds unity and diversity indissolubly intermingling, each 
necessary to and fused with the other. When this awareness is achieved, 
then in Hakuin’s words we have a totally new universe:
Master Caozi (Huineng, the Sixth Patriarch)’s old mirror has 
both heaven and hell, pure land and defiled one, reflected in
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it, but they are none other than the monk’s single eye.... 
None of them has anything to do with going and coming, or 
birth or death. ... The Buddha Amitayus is brilliantly 
manifest here and ndw.... All kinds of hell-suffering. ... 
are nothing but Amitayus Buddha’s whole body that shines 
with the color of purplish burnished gold. .. . Awakened be­
ings see it as the Land of the Light of eternal tranquillity/
Thus we might epitomize the Pali Canon view of the liberated saint 
as one who walks among his fellow men (or lives in a monastery with 
other liberation-seeking individuals) open-eyed and totally disabused 
of the illusion that the world about him has anything of worth to offer 
him, serene and at peace in his detachment. The liberated Mahayana 
saint is likewise free from enslavement by the sheer visibilities and 
tangibilities of his world; but, by a deeper penetration into its true 
essence, beholds it sub specie aetemitatis as the all-inclusive nature of 
the Buddha.
Obviously these represent the elitist version of Buddhist practice. In 
the Pali Canon-observant Theravada tradition this, a saint’s version of 
Buddhist salvation, has become the ideal for the monkish community. 
For Mahayana it is the High Bodhisattvic road of Wisdom whose vi­
sion can pierce through the gross evils and suffering in the world to its 
essential Buddha Nature, likewise achieved by the very few. These are 
the paths and communities of spiritual specialists who intensively 
follow the paths of meditative discipline.
What is there in this for rest of the world, for fellow Buddhists who5 6 
remain in the ordinary samsaric world, of necessity dealing with it 
somewhat in its own (delusional) terms? These also cherish the hope of 
liberation from samsara’s thrall and the evil spell of their own false 
selfhood, but at a great, great distance, many lives hence. What have
5 “Sokkdroku-kaien-fusetsu”, Section 30, p. 86f. in Hakuin-oshO-zenshQ, Vol. 2, 
pp. 403-4. Translated by Tokiwa Gishin.
6 Monkish prejudice against the lower-level layman as not a true part of the sangha 
still exists. Heinz Bechert (Buddhismus: Stoat und Gesellschaft in den Ldndem des 
Theravada Buddhismus, Frankfort: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1966, Vol. I, p. 67) quotes 
a Sri Lankan monk thus: “The religion of Buddha consists of only three elements, of 




these basic world views for the ethical guidance of the great Buddhist 
communities of lay persons (and the world) in the way of life-guiding 
principles? And what effect have the basic self-world views had upon 
the societies that Buddhism has permeated or strongly influenced?
The Basic Buddhist Ethical Pattern'.
Embodiment of Common Societal Values
At the level of the ordinary Theravada lay community the basic pat­
tern set forth as “Buddhist” actually embodies the ethical norms 
found in most of the world's societies. It is contained in the Five 
Precepts which enjoin the avoidance of taking life, taking another's 
possessions, of speaking falsehoods, of promiscuous sexuality, and use 
of intoxicants which cause outrageous behavior. Such standards seem 
necessary for the minimal functioning of almost any social grouping. 
They are of course generally observed by Mahayana Buddhists as well, 
with minor variations.
There is one aspect of these basic standards which is distinctively 
Buddhist. The prohibition of life-taking is ideally extended to all forms 
of sentient life, human and animal, halting a little this side of the Jain 
prohibition of the destruction of even the plant-root life. In actuality 
there are frequent evasions of this standard even in strongly Buddhist 
communities7; nevertheless it has had an important influence upon 
their dominant ethos.
7 The Burmese layman may not eat beef, but he often eats gnapi, qt fish paste. The 
rationalization: Fish, upon being pulled out of the water are not killed, they simply die 
of themselves.
The Lay-Buddhist Ethical Ideal
One might say generally that the lay Buddhist ideal ethic is a best­
possible imitation or mirroring of the saintly enlightenment-level ethic 
in so far as the layperson tries to maximize the Five precept morality, 
or even go somewhat beyond it in a truly Buddhist manner. Two 
passages will set forth that Buddhist moreness.
The Pali Canon ideal mode of the saint’s relation to others, the 
arhat-minded practice, is the perfection of the practice of the four il- 
limitables, or divine abidings: loving kindness (metta), compassion 
(karuna), joy in the joy of others (mu ditO'), climaxing in even-
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mindedness or equanimity (upekkhti). These break down the distinc­
tions between “self* and “other” and eradicate those of “better,” 
“equal,” and “worse” in thought and action. Such an one can now be 
“engaged in the practice of mercy and compassion for (all) living 
things.” This arhat-mind set abides in equanimity “regards ... ‘self 
and ‘others’ with the same impartial eye, since the objects of all the 
Abidings are but ‘mental objects consisting in concepts.’ ”•
The imitation of this mode of conduct in lay life would seem to be im­
practicable in any direct manner. Perhaps the monkish sangha—with 
its non-competitive brotherhood of mutual concern—is the social ideal 
that should be followed in Buddhist lay society; but there seems to be 
small evidence that many (any?) Buddhist societies have even attemp­
ted to follow such a model. This may root in the origins of Buddhism 
as a non-worldly sect of Nirvana-seekers who in the course of time 
developed stable communities that needed lay support. It was 
initially considered very difficult, though not quite impossible, for 
the “householder” to attain deliverance, given his worldly cares.
In any case those suttas, as for instance the Sigalovada sutta, which 
prescribe “Buddhist” rules of conduct (put into the mouth of the Bud­
dha) go little beyond the general pattern of traditional Indian duties 
owed by those in each station of life to those above, those on a level, 
and those below oneself socially.
More meaningful is the bodhisattva pattern, which was later adopted 
with considerable 6clat by Mahayana as the Buddhist Ideal of conduct. 
For the Pali Canon the bodhisattva is of course a Buddha-in-the-mak- 
ing in his ages-long career from the time of the initial vow to become a 
Buddha till its final achievement, which involves many human and 
animal rebirths. But the bodhisattvic qualities remain constant through 
all rebirths: wisdom, forbearance, generosity, loving-kindness, just­
ness, faithfulness to given social station, self-, even life-sacrifice for 
others, and the like. And as the type of living which leads to Bud- 
dhahood in the end it can therefore be a model for the layman who is 
not yet able to embrace the monk’s quest for immediate enlightenment.
Mahayana picked up and then expanded the bodhisattvic pattern on 
a glorious scale, the highest possible ideal for conduct. One does not




selfishly and narrowly seek nirvanic release for oneself but resolves 
upon endless rebirths till all sams&ra-bound beings shall be saved by 
one’s efforts. Thus is compassion added to bodhisattvic wisdom. And 
Mahayanist writers were not loath to develop this theme. £antideva in 
his Path of Light wrote as follows:
I would faith become a soother of all sorrows of all creatures. 
May I be a balm to the sick, a healer and servitor, until 
sickness come never again; may I be an unfailing store for the 
poor, and serve them with manifold things for their need. My 
own being and my pleasures, all my righteousness in the past, 
present, and future [and impliedly all personal desire for 
Nirvana) I surrender indifferently that all creatures may 
win to their end.9
’ The Pilgrimage of Buddhism, James B. Pratt. New York: Macmillan, 1928, p. 
219.
As thus portrayed the Mahayana Bodhisattvas ethically displace the 
Buddha, who is elevated to Cosmic Essence.
Resultant Ethical Values
What then can be said to be the ethical results of the Buddhist percep­
tions of self, world, and the meaning of salvation? Perhaps the out­
standing general characteristic is the predominant emphasis on the gentle, 
benevolent, self-sacrificing and altruistic virtues, with a conspicuous 
lack of emphasis upon the vigorous aggressive ones such as bravery, 
courage, honor, justice, and righteousness. And anyone who has lived 
for any length of time in a Buddhist-formed culture has been aware of 
a quality of gentle tolerance in individual behavior—though some of 
this no doubt is due to other cultural and to ethnic factors.
But what are the reasons for this generally “softer” ethical 
behavioral ideal? Of course, in general, the de-emphasis upon the 
individual self and its claims upon the world strikes a blow at the 
very root of most of the more “vigorous” ethical values, for many of 
them flow from the aggressive claims of the “self’ to its goods, rights, 
and proper place in society. But this is not the depth of the matter; the 
real foundations lie deeper than this their manifestation.
We may note at least three factors here, all germane to the self-world
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views of Buddhism. The first to be noted is the Buddhist doctrine of the 
karmic-kinship linkage of all forms of life with each other, without ex­
ception. In the foundational Pali Canon view there can be no exclusive­
ly human pride-of-soul since “human beings” may become animals, 
ghosts, beings in hell, heavenly devas and vice versa—though only on 
the human level is there salvation. Hence a human being’s attitude 
should be a blend of profound gratefulness for present human status, 
and determination to retain such status through “good” Buddhist 
living. It should also generate a non-despising benevolence toward 
“lesser” forms of life.
In Mahayana the same linked-to-life quality is implicitly, though less 
explicitly, present. Though the doctrine of the implicit Buddhahood of 
all sentient, perhaps also non-sentient, beings (so DOgen) should 
accord with the Pali Canon view, there is scant if any emphasis upon 
possible animal rebirths. Here the bodhisattvic compassion is to be 
extended primarily to all human beings, “saint” and “sinner” alike, 
since one may readily become the other.
There is a second aspect of karma which is of fundamental ethical 
significance here. In both Pali Canon and Mahayana Buddhism— 
though less rigorously in the latter—karma is Justice incarnate, func­
tionally equivalent to Yahweh, God, and Allah in other religious con­
texts. The mills of karma may grind slowly but they grind with absolute 
moral fineness. Nothing escapes fine-tuned Karma—not the slightest 
thought, word, or deed—for either good or ill. Hence in the Buddhist 
world there is no pressing need for human enforcement of the stan­
dards of right and wrong, or the imposition of “just” punishments 
upon the wicked, and the rewarding of the righteous as in Christian 
and Muslim cultures, wherein the Almighty (out of necessity?) has 
appointed many human agents of His justice. Understandably the 
Buddhist is concerned with the possible pollution of Divine justice by 
human ignorance and malevolence.
The third factor here is the most subtle but the most important of all 
influences: the influence of the Buddhist view of self and world. The 
Pali Canon Buddhist perceives an illusory “self* living deludedly in 
a samsaric push-pull world which is largely the product of the “self* 
illusion. The Mahayana Buddhist perceives the individual human self 
living in a debasing separatist ignorance of his or her true self nature, 
which in reality is integrally enmeshed with the glorious wholeness of
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Reality. In Pali Canon Buddhism the game of life is not worth the 
candle when played in samsaric terms; in Mahayana the Real Game is 
much more glorious than ordinary selfhood can imagine.
The resulting ethical situation is an oddly ambiguous one. For Bud­
dhism, either Pali Canon or Mahayana variety, neither world nor self 
are what they seem to be. But in order to free the non-self from its self- 
delusion, to “save” the non-self to emancipation, its accompanying 
world must be down-valued or transvalued from what it seems to be. 
The importance of the world as it stands before the human being must 
be deflated (Pali Canon) or immanentalized into a higher-self’s 
transformed awareness (Mahayana), so that ordinariness or ugliness 
become transcendent beauty (so Hakuin). The important upshot for 
ethics is that Buddhism thus refuses to deal with the world on its own 
terms. It has no mandate to save the world, only to save selves from 
themselves.
The Passive Buddhist Societal Role
The societal-cultural results of this other-valued world and self view 
are familiar to all students of Buddhist influenced cultures. The first to 
be noted is the passive accommodative acceptance of the traditional 
cultural patterns into which Buddhism has been introduced. Or rather 
it would be more accurate to say that the preferred Buddhist mode of 
cultural change has been one of infiltration, adaptation, and modifica­
tion rather than the aggressive and violent cultural changes enforced by 
Christianity and Islam in many cases. Buddhism has been marvellously 
adaptive. Native spirit religions have been gently assigned a secondary 
role; they are to be utilized in a fully samsiric manner to deal with the 
world as it seems to be—the world of sickness/health, poverty/riches, 
failure/success, sorrow/happiness. The Buddhist values are largely 
transcendent of these matters, having to do with far-off final release 
from such a world and some on-the-way-by amelioration of its ills. 
Thus do folk religion and Buddhism live side by side in Theravada and 
Mahayana lands, each performing its proper function for the Buddhist 
Layman.
Along with this and sometimes overlapping with it is the societal 
adaptiveness of Buddhism. That is, Buddhism has usually accepted the 
dominant forms of social organization in the countries it has 
penetrated. This means that male, family, clan, ethnic, and national
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dominance have been accepted almost as they stand; concern for in­
dividual and depressed-group freedoms and rights has been almost 
totally missing from the Buddhist message. Woman's subordination 
has been reinforced: women cannot become Buddhas. The reasons for 
this are not far to seek. One such factor is the Buddhist doctrine of kar­
mic destiny; for while karma positively relates humankind (especially 
in Theravada Buddhism) to all sentient being as kin to it, by the same 
token each individual deserves his or her present status—male/female, 
rich/poor, healthy/diseased, fortunate/unfortunate and no one else 
can fundamentally change his or her lot. Thus a certain callousness to 
others’ plights may exist side by side with a benevolent non-harm­
fulness of behavior.
The other basic reason is our main subject of interest here: the 
nature of Buddhist self. As we have seen there is no immortal soul of 
eternal worth, or unique rational-sensible individual whose freedom 
and social worth must be protected. There is only an evanescent set of 
mental-physical factors “deserving” its present existential situation or 
a Buddha-in-disguise whose present circumstances can be gloriously 
transfigured by an inner awakening which transforms its present world 
into a Buddha realm or Pure Land. All this can (and should?) be done 
without lifting a finger to change historical-social conditions. Of 
course no Buddhist would espouse precisely such sentiments; but this 
implicit logic of Buddhist self- and world-views subtly undercuts 
vigorous assertions of individual human worth at their root.
Finally, and quite naturally, due to this self-same self- and world­
view, from the very beginning Buddhism has been loath to undertake 
governmental roles. For what have true Buddhists to do with political 
struggles for power, glory, and worldly dominion, with the building of 
dynasties and empires? Such concerns are the very quintessence of 
samsaric delusion and its un-Buddhistic pursuit. And besides all this 
there is the question of means; rulership, political power, and domi­
nion are only achieved by the use of force, violence, and killing.
In stark contrast to Christian-righteous and Muslim-just rulers who 
have considered themselves divinely ordained to bring men to true rec­
titude and faith—even at the cost of their lives! Buddhist sovereigns 
have been uneasy with their role. King ASoka repented himself, we are 
told, of the bloodshed by which he gained control of most of India and 
sought to be a benevolent ruler. Yet even he had perforce to keep his
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army and political power intact. Various “Buddhist” sovereigns in 
Southeast Asia following his model sought to atone for kingly- 
necessary violence by extensive pagoda building and “benevolent” 
rule.
In a modem case U Nu, as prime minister of Burma (1947-1958, 
1960-62), who sought to achieve a “Buddhist socialism,” confessed to 
a friend that his duties as head of state—including that of encouraging 
his troops to fight the insurgents—were at odds with his personal 
efforts to achieve enlightenment. But he felt as a would-be bodhisattva 
that his state headship as a Buddhist was of some service to humanity 
(in the bodhisattvic mode) and that his leadership of the nation might 
serve as an example of “Buddhist” rule to the world. (The maximum 
advancement of his own enlightenment prospects would have to wait.) 
But it is obvious that the role of “Buddhist” statecraft is neither 
natural to Buddhism nor easy to define or fulfill. Be it repeated: The 
Buddhist mandate is not to “save” the world by “reforming” it but to 
enable the individual “self’ to overcome it from within—for the world 
order is fundamentally unsaveable.
Conclusion
Our conclusion must be in the form of a question: Whither Buddhist 
ethics in today’s world? It is a world in which personal-social concerns 
about individual and class rights and freedoms—those of the 
individual as such, of women, of ethnic and social-class groups— 
about justice, equal opportunity for social and economic status, and 
the environment, to name only a few, are clamorous realities. And 
these are all patently samsAric in nature, concerns of “unredeemed” 
samsaric individuality and its world. Can either world-deflating Pali 
Canon Buddhism, or world-immanentalizing Mahayana, speak 
meaningfully to these concerns and issues out of their own traditional 
resources, or will some infusion of new values and perspectives from 
without be necessary? Surely this must be the paramount concern 
facing Buddhist ethics in the modern world. The socially passive­
conformist patterns of traditionalist Asian societies of yesteryear will 
no longer serve Buddhism well.
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